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ABSTRACT
Exploratory Study of Construction Safety Culture Through Systems Thinking
by
Charles J. Benford Jr.
Dr. David Shields, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Construction Management 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Since its conception, in 1986 after the Chernobyl accident, the term “safety culture” 
has gained major popularity throughout many systems, especially the construction 
industry. Although this concept has gained much popularity over the course of two 
decades, it remains a heavily debated topic between advocates and skeptics for various 
reasons. Much of the skepticism is due to the failure o f proponents of the concept to 
clearly define and provide an understanding o f those factors that comprise what “safety 
culture” is, and how it can be achieved. A system (particularly a construction system) 
that possesses a safety culture is one in which safety is the first priority of all individuals 
involved from top-level management to those at the operational level including, but not 
limited to owners, architects, engineers, general contractors, subcontractors, vendors, 
workers, etc. Hence, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving 
safety within systems.
System Dynamics, as defined by founder Jay Forrester, is the combination of theory, 
methods, and philosophy intended to analyze the behavior of systems in not only
111
management, but also in environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine, 
engineering, and other fields. The objective of this thesis is to provide clarity to existing 
research and literature which defines construction safety culture, and explain how System 
Thinking/Dynamics is an effective tool for understanding and achieving a construction 
safety culture in a complex system. The program Vensim is used to construct a visual 
systems thinking model of causal loops that will ultimately provide a better 
understanding of construction safety culture. This model will illustrate the causal 
relationships between various safety-related variables as they pertain to the construction 
industry.
Keywords: Construction safety culture, systems thinking, safety
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
It is difficult to comprehend that with all the technological advances that have been 
made in the industry, the number of accidents that occur in construction remains higher 
than those of any other industry. Accidents resulting in injury and fatality have always 
been a “black eye” for the construction industry. Of course, there has been some 
improvement in regards to safety in construction. There has been a slight decrease in the 
number of incidents reported over the past few years, but in comparison to other 
industries the numbers remain disturbing to researchers and safety professionals. Who is 
to blame for these safety mishaps? Much of the research that has been collected on 
construction safety concentrates on the number o f accidents that have occurred in a 
certain time period, and then researchers, as well as policymakers, attempt to use these 
data to somehow achieve what “they” believe to be safety. At this point, the damage has 
been done. These data do provide valuable information; however, it is my belief that this 
approach does not achieve the ultimate goal, but only serves well as a numerical 
representation of a problem that has scarred this industry for much too long. Reactive 
measures are not the solution to achieving safety in complex systems. Safety cannot wait 
to be emphasized. It must be embedded and practiced at all times throughout the entire 
construction organization from the highest executive down to the operatives, and must be
I
continuously observed, measured, and improved as required. “The only way of knowing 
if safety really exists is to measure it and as the saying goes— if you don’t keep score you 
are only practicing” (Ahmad & Gihb, 2004). Construction safety must exist within an 
organization like a culture or a way of life. Culture generally refers to patterns of human 
activity and the symbolic structures that give such activities significance and importance. 
In a system, culture is the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that 
characterizes an institution or organization.
1.2 Why Study Construction Safety?
Construction is one o f the largest industries in the United States. The U.S Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2007) states that in 2006 there were 7.7 million wage and salary 
workers, and another 1.9 million self-employed individuals working in the construction 
industry. The number of workers in the construction industry continues to grow, hut it is 
fair to say that safety awareness and zero-accident philosophy, unfortunately, has not 
experienced the same growth. Much of the industry’s growth can be attributed to the 
financial gains that can be achieved in most sectors of construction. Despite the known 
dangers and health-related risks associated with construction work, individuals are 
attracted to the relatively high hourly earnings that can he attained in the field. In 2006, 
the average wage of a construction worker who did not hold a supervisory position was 
$20.02 an hour. You would think that an industry that has the ability to pay this type of 
money to its operatives would have the necessary finances to ensure a safe working 
environment, hut it doesn’t. The wage partly is a compensating differential for the 
danger; many insured contractors probably find self-insurance better than accident
prevention. It is easy to blame the employers, but workers are just as much responsible 
for the accident rates that plague the industry. Safety seems to be no more of a priority of 
workers than it does employers. The problem is that the industry prioritizes production 
and profit, not safety. Historically, construction related fatalities have accounted for 
nearly 17-20% of all occupational related deaths (Hill, 2004). In 2006, the death rate for 
construction was 11.1 per 100,000 full-time workers, nearly three times the average rate 
of 4.2 per 100,000 full-time workers for all industries (CPWR, 2007). Figure 1 compares 
fatal occupational injuries for construction and other industries based on U.S Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data.
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Figure 1. Number and rate o f fatal occupational injuries by industry sector 
(CPWR, 2007).
This is the highest number reported by any other occupation. The Center for 
Construction Research and Training (formerly the Centers to Protect Workers’ Rights), 
which is a non-profit organization created by the Building and Construction Trades 
Department of the AFL-CIO to perform research and training on construction safety, 
investigated the leading causes of death in the construction from 1992 through 2005 and 
their findings were as follows (in rank order): the highest ranking causes o f work-related 
deaths were falls to a lower level, highway incidents (motor vehicle related crashes), 
being struck by falling objects, and contact with electric current (a subcategory of 
exposure to harmful substances or environments). The distribution of leading causes of 
death are shown in Figure 2.
Exposure, 13.5%
Contact with 
object, 20.0%
Other, 6,2%
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Transportation,
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Figure 2. The distribution o f leading causes of death from injuries in 
construction from 1992 to 2005 (CPWR, 2007).
The Center for Construction Research and Training (CPWR) (formerly the Center to 
Protect Workers’ Rights), also provides a breakdown, by occupation, of work-related 
fatalities sustained in 2007. Figure 3 illustrates their findings.
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Figure 3. Fatal occupational injuries by occupation and selected event of 
exposure, (CPWR, 2007)
It is important to note that these figures represent just the fatalities that have occurred 
in the construction industry. The numbers for injuries sustained in the construction field 
present an even more alarming representation of the safety concerns in the industry.
Thus, one of the most important reasons for research in this area of study is that safety 
typically has an effect on every aspect or phase of any complex system or organization.
In the construction industry, safety impacts design and planning, bidding, scheduling, 
construction, costs, overhead, etc. Safety impacts productivity, efficiency, and , 
constructability. There is no operation or system that may exist without taking safety into 
consideration, and its due attention is critical to the functioning of all systems.
Safety is one of those topics that is frequently taken for granted. It is often assumed 
that some other individual has been given the responsibility o f taking safety into 
consideration at any given point o f a construction process. For example, it is often 
assumed that the architect has taken into consideration the possible hazards that may 
occur as a result o f the complexity o f his/her design. It is assumed that safety personnel 
are performing “walk-arounds” to recognize potential hazards. It is important for safety 
to exist not only as a priority in the construction industry, but as a culture just as the 
concepts of productivity and profitability exist in the industry. The objectives o f this 
research thesis are: (1) define construction safety culture in its’ entirety from conception 
to present day, (2) effectively explain the discipline of systems thinking and contributing 
factors such as modeling and simulation, and (3) explain how systems thinking is an 
effective tool for building a construction safety culture. Finally, this research will 
demonstrate that if  organizations (including all levels) adopt and remain committed to the 
system thinking approach to construction safety culture the industry’s ultimate goal of
reducing injuries and fatalities at construction sites can and will be accomplished.
1.3 Costs o f Accidents in the Construction Industry
Although their approaches to safety are reactive in nature, many organizations are 
finally emphasizing the prioritization of safety culture within their systems because o f the 
extreme financial burdens of accidents and injuries. In fact, the cost o f accidents is 
frequently cited by organizations as a major motivation for addressing health and safety 
(Hinze, 1996). This fact is unfortunate, but very true. It makes the assumption that if  it 
would not be for the extremely high costs o f construction accidents, then organizations 
would not place an emphasis on safety. There are two types of costs related to 
construction accidents: direct cost and indirect costs. Direct costs are those costs incurred 
directly as a result of medical costs and loss of wages from injuries. Indirect costs are all 
other costs incurred as a result o f an accident such as: fines, lawsuits, damaged 
equipment, production delays, etc. In a study performed by Tang et al. (1997) many of 
the financial costs as a result of accidents were identified including:
• Loss due to the injured worker.
The compensation paid to the worker by the contractor is two-thirds o f the 
wage o f the injured person for each day of absence from work.
Disability compensation, which depends on the percentage of disability 
that the injured worker suffers.
• Loss due to the inefficiency o f the worker who has just recovered from injury 
upon resuming work.
When an injured person returns to work, he or she cannot initially work 
with 100% efficiency.
• Loss due to medical expenses.
Medical expenses of the injured worker, including the cost of transport to 
the hospital.
• Loss due to fines and legal expenses.
- If the contractor faces prosecution, he may have to pay damages and fines 
imposed by the court.
• Loss of productivity of other employees.
The safety officer, site workers, project engineer, and foremen may be 
involved in assisting the injured and carrying out works related to the 
accident such as accident investigation and report writing.
Other workers may have to stop immediately after the occurrence o f the 
Accident.
• Loss due to damaged equipment.
• Loss due to damaged material or finished work.
• Loss due to idle machinery or equipment.
After an accident has occurred, the workers may stop work temporarily 
and hence there will be idle machinery or equipment.
According to the CPWR, the total costs o f fatal and nonfatal injures in the 
construction industry is estimated at nearly $13 billion annually (CPWR, 2007). 
Construction workers experienced 414,900 injury and illness cases in 2005, of which 
157,100 cases were serious enough to require days away from work -  lost workday cases
8
-about 628 per workday. Illnesses are less than 2.5% of the total in construction, so the 
numbers for construction essentially show injuries. Compared with other industries, the 
construction industry had the second highest rate o f 239.5 per 10,000 full-time workers in 
2005 (manufacturing industry has the highest rate), about 76% higher than the average 
rate of 135.7 per 10,000 full-time workers for all private industries. Overall, the rate of 
work-related deaths in construction declined gradually from 14.3 to 11.1 per 100,000 
full-time workers from 1992 to 2005, while the rate of serious nonfatal injuries and 
illnesses dropped significantly by 55% from 529.5 to 239.5 per 10,000 full-time workers 
during this period. The rates of work-related deaths in construction are not as high as in 
agriculture and mining, but the rates of nonfatal injuries and illnesses in construction 
exceeded that for other goods-producing industries over time. Deaths are estimated to be 
40% of the total, and nonfatal injuries and illnesses represent the other 60% of the total 
costs. Their research states that the death o f a construction work on a project results in a 
valued loss of $4 million, while nonfatal injuries usually average about $42,000 per 
occurrence. These estimates include direct and indirect costs, and quality-of-life costs. 
Construction laborers and carpenters ranked the highest in cost for both nonfatal and fatal 
injuries, and the top five construction industries, which accounted for over half o f the 
fatal and nonfatal injury costs included: miscellaneous specialty trade contractors; 
plumbing, heating, and air conditioning; electrical work; heavy construction except 
highway; and residential building construction (CPWR, 2007). Figures 4 through 6 
represent their findings.
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Figures 4, 5, & 6. Estimated costs of work-related injuries by construction 
industry, by selected construction occupation, and by type o f health 
service received (CPWR, 2007).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Defining Construction Safety Culture
The term ‘safety culture’ first made its appearance in the 1987 Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear agency report on the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster (Mohamed, 2003). On April 26, 1986 two explosions blew off the 
1000 ton cap sealing the Chernobyl 4 reactor releasing molten core fragments into the 
vicinity. It was the worst accident in the history o f commercial nuclear power generation 
costing more than 30 lives, contaminating over 400 square miles and increased the 
number of cancer related deaths in Western Europe (Reason, 1990). Since its birth the 
philosophy has gained much popularity throughout many systems, especially within the 
construction industry, that view safety as their first priority. The Chernobyl report stated 
that it was a “poor safety culture” that caused this catastrophe. There are many factors 
which contribute to a “good” construction safety culture. Since safety culture is such a 
broad concept it has been met with much criticism which generally stems from the 
various definitions that lack precision. Some critics o f the safety culture paradigm 
consider it to be a fad (Woolfson, 1999), and others refer to it as a ‘catch-all’ for human 
factors issues and concept without substance (Cox and Flin, 1998). Also, the failure of 
researchers to establish means o f quantifying the concept o f construction safety culture 
has led negativist to bash its existence. System dynamics which will be addressed later
11
will dispute the quantification issue. Admittedly, there are various definitions of 
construction safety culture that has led to skepticism, but it is a concept that can exist 
within organizations. Many critics negate safety culture because it is not a “one size fits 
all” approach to safety for all organizations. This does not mean that a safety culture 
cannot be created; however, it does indicate that safety culture can be achieved in various 
ways and the means o f accomplishing is unique between systems. Hence, in regards to 
safety programs, what works for one organization may not work for others. Zhang et al. 
(2002) states that safety culture is comprised of the following factors:
• Safety culture is a concept defined at group level or higher, which refers to the 
shared values among all the group or organization members.
• Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and 
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems.
• Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level o f an 
organization.
• The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behavior at 
work.
• Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward system and 
safety performance.
• Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn 
from errors, incidents, and accidents.
• Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change.
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNl, 1993) 
produced one o f the most quoted definitions of safety culture to date. ACSNl defines
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safety culture as the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns o f behavior that determine the commitment to, and the 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management. What makes 
construction safety culture unique from all other approaches to reducing accidents is that 
it takes a top-down approach to achieving safety within systems. “The safety culture 
paradigm constitutes a holistic way of thinking about health and safety risk management 
to reveal underlying factors affecting safety performance in complex systems” (Peckitt et. 
al, 2004). This means that safety should not be the sole responsibility of individuals at 
the operational level; it should be the priority o f all parties involved including the client, 
architects, designers, subcontractors, vendors, etc. (Baxendale and Jones, 2003). The top- 
down approach includes observable measures such as management commitment, 
participation and accountability, procedures and policies, communication, etc (Mohamed, 
2004).
As expressed in this thesis, the factor o f management’s commitment to the 
construction safety culture is the most important factor necessary for its existence. There 
is much research that identifies management’s lack of commitment to safety as one of the 
key factors contributing to construction accidents. Management is the key that allows 
safety performance improvements to occur in organizations (Freda et. al, 1999). 
Management must also establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement 
systems. Without a reporting system, there is no way to measure and assess the state of 
the system’s safety. The objective of the reporting system is to not only monitor accident 
rates, but to identify accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect of site safety 
initiatives, and to estimate the costs of accidents (Rowlinson, 2004). A safety reporting
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system is another activity that requires continuous, active participation of all members 
within an organization from top level management to the operational level. Ahmad and 
Gibb (2004) state that measurement will enable comparison, benchmark performance, 
and track progress over time. System dynamics will provide a means for all factors 
associated with construction safety culture to be measured over time to reveal valuable 
information about the status o f an organization’s safety program.
2.2 Systems Thinking and System Dynamics
Systems thinking can be as a concept or idea, as an approach or study, or as a tool to 
create a better understanding. The objective of systems thinking is very “cut and dry”—to 
provide a clear understanding to eomplex, real world problems and situations by 
examining systems holistically. Systems thinking, as defined by Sherwood (2002), is the 
study of the connectedness between those systems’ component parts whether they be 
human beings, departments, or indeed businesses and organizations, as a whole.
“Systems thinking is a powerful approach for understanding the nature o f why situations 
are the way they are, and how to go about improving results” (Bellinger, 2004). Systems 
thinking is not an easy approach because it involves a significant amount of time, effort, 
and thought. Creating causal loop diagrams is the foundation upon which systems 
thinking is built. “Causal loop diagrams provide a language for articulating our 
understanding of the dynamic, interconnected nature of our world” (Kim, 1994). The 
causal loop diagrams provide researchers with a visual or mental model o f factors that 
may be occurring in a complex system or organization. What makes systems thinking 
ideal is that it addresses problems events, etc. that occur in a system in a holistic
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approach. As humans, when solving problems it is part of our instinctual abilities to 
dissect problems into smaller subparts in an attempt to gain insight and understanding of 
that system. However, when we do this we often solve problems that are unassociated 
with the initial one that we wanted to solve or miss our goals altogether. There are many 
reasons for using the systems thinking approach to studying complex systems as 
described by Belinger (2004);
• Often previous fixes seem to overshoot the goal
• Previous fixes has created problems elsewhere
• After a fix is applied the problem returns in time
• The same fixes are usually repeated
• There is a tendency to allow an established standard to slip
Once the causal loop diagrams have been constructed into mental models o f all that is 
occurring in the system the variable can be given mathematical computations to perform 
system dynamics modeling and simulation.
Jay Forrester, founder of system dynamics, defines it as the combination of theory, 
methods, and philosophy that is needed to analyze the behavior of systems in not only 
management, but also in environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine, 
engineering, and other fields. System dynamics takes the concepts from causal or 
feedback loops and organizes the information into computer simulated models.
Examples o f these feedback or causal loops are in the appendix o f this paper. The first 
articles based on system dynamics appeared in the Harvard Business Review (Forrester, 
1958). These computer simulations anticipate the behavior and actions o f a system and 
provide researchers with valuable information of how certain situations would occur 
given the presence of certain behaviors, variables, stimuli, etc. Regardless o f the type or
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format of the simulation, the overriding purpose for simulating systems remains: to 
provide a learning environment that supports the learner to develop mental models about 
the interrelationships of variables; to test the efficacy of these models in explaining or 
predicting events in a system; and to discover relationships among variables and/or 
confronting misconceptions (Milrad, 2002). The concept of system dynamics implies 
that individuals within a system do not make decisions or actions solely on their own; 
their decisions are motivated and driven by other factors within the system. In laymen’s 
terms “every action causes a reaction.” The discipline is known for its’ representation of 
causal loops for the behavior. Forrester (1991) states that “we live in an on-going 
circular environment in which each action is based on current conditions, such actions 
affect conditions, and the changed condition becomes the basis for future action; there is 
no beginning or end to the process.” As for construction which will be addressed later in 
the paper, system dynamics will not only examine individual causes o f why a safety error 
occurred, but most importantly why the system failed. The system dynamics approach 
will illustrate how the actual error may have begun as far as the top level management 
within the system. For example, a single accident although it may be linked to human 
error may have ultimately been caused by the management’s lack of commitment to 
safety or training. “System dynamics models organize, clarify, and unify knowledge that 
have previously caused confusion within a system and changes the way people think 
about that system by building on the reliable part of our understanding and compensating 
for the unreliable part” (Forrester, 1991).
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2.3 Achieving a Safety Culture Using System Dynamics
The outrageous number of accidents in the construction industry has led many 
researchers to develop new measures to combat this problem. Researchers believed that 
prior methods o f measuring accidents after they occurred and then implementing safety 
regulations and guidelines (a reactive approach) only achieved temporary success as far 
as safety was concerned. In response, researchers and construction safety culture 
advocates have begun using system dynamics, which involves modeling and simulation, 
to create safety management systems that will yield greater success. “The safety system 
label term encompasses all aspects of the organization’s safety management system 
including safety policies, procedures, committees, etc. and provides a systematic process 
for planning, implementing, monitoring, and reviewing safety performance” (Choudhury 
et al., 2007). Figure 7 presents a representation of Choudhury et al. (2007) elements of 
the safety system model.
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Figure 7. Basic elements of safety management system model (Choudhury et al., 
2007)
Mohamed (2004) states that the fundamental principle on which safety management 
systems are based is that all project participants (clients, architects, designers, 
subcontractors, etc.) who contribute to safety on a project must be included in 
considering safety issues systematically, stage by stage, from the outset o f the project.
His research model emphasizes the top-down approach to addressing safety in 
organizations. Systems thinking/dynamics is compatible with safety culture for one main 
reason: the top-down approach of safety culture implies that all levels or aspects o f a 
system will be incorporated into the problem solving technique and this holistic approach 
is shared with systems thinking and systems dynamics. Figure 8 presents this top-down 
approach to safety.
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Figure 8. Safety management system for strategic and operational 
implementation (Mohamed, 2004)
System dynamics appears to be an appropriate methodology for demonstrating safety 
culture through mental modeling in the construction industry, as well as any occupation. 
For example, system dynamics was used to determine the cause of the Chernobyl 
accident that was mentioned in the introduction. In the study by Salge and Milling 
(2006), two stages of human failure were investigated by two separate system dynamics 
models including (1) the design of the reactor and (2) on-line operations. The system 
dynamics analyses indicate that the accident was caused by the combination of the 
specific reactor characteristics and infringements on safety rules which had previously 
not caused accidents, but led to more violations of safety rules and ultimately caused the 
Chernobyl accident (Salge and Miller, 2006). Reason (1990) suggests that “systems 
accidents have their primary origins in latent failures committed by designers and other 
high-level decision makers which typically become apparent due to certain unsafe acts
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committed by operators.” Dulac et. al (2005) states that “while reduction in safety efforts 
and lower prioritization of safety concerns may lead to accidents, accidents usually do not 
occur for a considerable time period (years) so false confidence is created that the 
reductions are having no impact on safety and therefore pressures increase to reduce 
safety efforts and priority even further as the external performance pressures mount.” An 
example of these latent failures in the construction industry may be the impact of 
productivity pressure by upper management on the workers of a project.
When pressure is placed on employees to achieve higher production rates, workers 
tend to neglect certain measures, generally safety, in an effort to cut time during certain 
activities. For example the fall of worker as a result of his/her failure to “tie-off,” of 
course, at the individual level is viewed as human error, but system dynamics provides 
deeper understanding of how multiple variables such as management’s lack of 
commitment to regulation enforcement may have contributed to the fall. Again, system 
dynamics uses a top-down approach to analyzing safety.
In developing system dynamics modeling for construction safety, literature covering 
research on the 1986 space shuttle Challenger incident was also examined. In one study, 
Cooke and Rohleder (2006) developed an organizational response system called incident 
learning in which normal precursor incidents are used in a learning process to combat 
complacency and avoid larger disasters such as the Challenger incident. Their system 
dynamics model, presented in Figure 9, provided valuable, latent information to the 
causes of the Challenger incident.
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Figure 9. Systems thinking model of the incident learning system (Cooke and 
Rohleder, 2006)
The goal of their model was to motivate managers to implement learning systems that 
will achieve more reliable safety performance. Using system dynamics in the shuttle 
disaster cited the ultimate cause to be “the inability of the organization involved to 
effectively synthesize and share the information from separate precursor incidents with 
the relevant people across the organization so that appropriate action could be taken to 
reduce the risk of disaster” ( Cooke and Rohdeler, 2006). The incident learning system 
constructed by Cooke and Rohdeler allows for the reporting, recording, and 
communication of information involving minor incidents to improve safety performance 
over time which will, in turn, prevent major disasters. Similar research incorporating 
system dynamics to accident causation was used in the Westray mining disaster by Cooke 
(2003). In this model, such factors as management commitment to safety, worker
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training, and productivity revealed valuable information on what contributed to the 
disaster. This model is presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Systems thinking model o f the Westray mine disaster (Cooke, 2003)
Other research which incorporates system dynamics with construction safety focuses 
on construction accident causation. This literature focuses on “how the characteristics of 
the production system generate hazardous situations and shape the work behaviors and 
analyzes the conditions that trigger the release of the hazards. The model identifies the 
need for two accident prevention strategies: (1) reliable production planning to reduce 
task unpredictability, and( 2) error management to increase worker’s ability to avoid 
error” (Mitropoulos et ah, 2005). There have been various models constructed on safety
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which have identified various factors and causes contributing to accidents. McClay 
(1989) presented his “universal framework” which identified hazards, human actions, and 
functional limitations to be the key elements of accidents. Hinze’s distraction theory 
cited that the distraction of workers from hazards and potential accidents was due to 
production pressures (Hinze, 1996). Management deficiencies, training, and workers 
attitudes were identified as key elements in accidents in Abdelhamid and Everett (2000). 
There is research as early as Levitt (1975) which targets top management’s attitude (or 
lack thereof) toward safety as an underlying factor in accident causation. Toole (2002) 
identified various root causes of accidents: lack of proper training, safety equipment not 
provided, deficient enforcement o f safety, unsafe equipment, method, or condition, poor 
safety attitude, and isolated deviation from prescribed behavior. It is evident that there 
has been much research performed on modeling construction safety. One downfall of 
some, not all, systems approaches to construction safety is that they only focus on 
reducing the risks, but fail to increase the safety effort (Mitropoulus et ah, 2005). “Safety 
efforts to control workers’ behaviors reduce exposures to hazards” (Mitroupolus et ah, 
2005). This research thesis will construct a systems thinking model that will incorporate 
various factors required to achieve a safety culture in the construction industry.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Variable Identification
As previously stated, the concept of construction safety culture has gained popularity 
over the course of two decades since the Chernobyl disaster. However, the concept 
remains at the center o f debates because of the failure of many advocates to provide an 
explicit understanding of what it actually is and how this “culture” may be achieved. One 
tool that has shed light on this issue is the application of systems thinking to construction 
safety culture. Systems thinking investigates complex problems by determining causal 
relationships between a system’s factors. It is the ultimate goal of this thesis to 
demonstrate the usefulness o f systems thinking as a tool in hopes that organizations will 
use the systems thinking approach to establish or re-establish a safety culture within their 
system.
3.2 Management Commitment
The first step in the application of the systems thinking approach to construction 
safety culture is variable identification. This step involves indentifying and defining 
those variables or factors that are most valuable to the existence of a safety culture. 
Identifying all relevant factors is the prerequisite to construction of the system model. As 
mentioned before, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving safety
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within the system. Therefore, our analysis must focus on what is believed to be the most 
important factor in safety culture— management’s commitment to safety.
Management’s commitment to safety is the most important factor necessary to 
achieving a safety culture. Most research performed on safety has identified 
management’s lack of commitment to safety as the root cause o f accidents in various 
industries, specifically construction. In system dynamics modeling, management 
commitment can be measured as the level o f commitment o f management, as perceived 
by workers, to the safety program or safety culture of their organization. This 
information may be obtained by administering surveys, questionnaires, or interviews.
The individuals being interviewed will be asked to rate using the Likert scale (1-5 with 5 
being the highest) management’s level of commitment to safety in the organization. It 
cannot be expected of individuals at the operative level to keep safety as their first 
priority if management has a lax commitment to it. Management is the key that allows 
safety performance improvements to occur in organizations (Freda et ah, 1999). Safety is 
a social construct which means that the behaviors and attitudes that individuals develop 
towards it is learned and/or influenced by others in the environment. Therefore, “health 
and safety management is primarily dependent upon the occupational risk-related 
attitudes and behaviors of directors, managers, and workers who are part o f the 
organization and wider society (Peckitt et ah, 2004). Management’s involvement in 
safety must go beyond constructing a set of rules and policies for individuals to follow at 
their own discretion. Management’s commitment to construction safety culture cannot be 
overemphasized—the existence of this factor in the systems thinking application is 
crucial to the overall success of the model. Therefore, one can conclude that commitment
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is a prerequisite to creating and sustaining a positive safety culture in construction site 
environments (Mohamed, 2004). The systems thinking application to construction 
safety culture requires that all individuals that make up a system change the way they 
view safety in that environment. Change in any environment or situation is typically 
difficult to accomplish. For whatever reasons, people often resist change because they 
have grown accustomed to performing in a manner that is routine. Often, it is hilarious to 
see or hear construction organizations preach safety as their first priority, but begin 
toolbox meetings discussing increased productivity, cost control, etc. It may be difficult 
for an organization which has previously prioritized profit and production to make a shift 
to safety as the central focus. However, when upper management ‘buys in’ to these 
changes, it ensures success (Petersen, 1998). The degree to which upper level 
management becomes involved in the safety culture of the organization is directly 
proportional to the ultimate success. Diamond (1998) states that organizational change 
demands executive commitment and investment that is cognitive, emotional, and 
financial. The shift to a construction safety culture requires that managers and 
supervisors “set the tone” by leading by the examples they set forth. Freda et al. (1999) 
states, “major change is impossible unless the upper management of construction firms 
actively and demonstrably supports and understands the needs for the changes they 
introduce.” The requisite changes to achieve a construction safety culture must not only 
include a commitment that is cognitive, emotional, and financial as suggested by 
Diamond (1998), but it must also include a commitment that is recognizable by all 
individuals within that system.
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3.3 Training
Another main factor that is detrimental to the existence and maintenance of 
construction safety culture is a thorough safety training program. Rowlinson (2004) 
identifies three basic types o f training required including: (1) induction training which 
focuses on the worker that is new to the construction site and introduces basic safety 
awareness; (2) refresher training which is aimed at those workers who have been in the 
construction business for a length o f time and introduces them to the current and 
innovative methods and practices; and (3) ongoing training which addresses the need for 
continuous training and education on various safety procedures. In system dynamics 
modeling, training can be measured as the total amount o f hours per year an organization 
requires training for their employees, including: induction training, refresher training, and 
ongoing training. Many construction accidents occur because workers lack adequate 
safety training— this means that they are either unknowledgeable or incompetent on the 
current safe practices and/or lack the ability to recognize potential hazards before they 
occur. “Formal safety training has proven to be the most effective and successful way to 
ensure that workers possess the knowledge required to perform tasks in a safe manner” 
(Fiori, 2004).
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed in 1970 to establish a universal, 
government regulated standard for safety for all industries in the United States with an 
ultimate objective of creating a safe working environment for all individuals. Out of this 
act. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was established. One 
of the key components of OSHA is that it places the responsibility of safety on the 
employers and/or management o f companies. Thus, reiterating the importance of
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management commitment to a safety culture within an organization. OSHA’s section 
1926.21 or 29 CFR is dedicated to the responsibility of employers and managers for 
providing safety training and education within the construction industry. The standards 
are as follows;
Regulaions (Standards -  29 CFR)
Safety training and education. -  1926.21
Part Number: 1926
Part Title: Safety and Health Regulations for Construction
Subpart: C
1926.21(a)
General requirements. The Secretary shall, pursuant to section 107(f) o f the Act, 
establish and supervise programs for the education and training o f employers and 
employees in the recognition, avoidance and prevention o f unsafe conditions in 
employments covered by the act.
1926.21(b)
Employer responsibility.
1926.21(b)(1)
The employer should avail himself o f the safety and health training programs the 
Secretary provides.
1926.21(b)(2)
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The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance o f unsafe 
conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate 
any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury.
1926.21(b)(3)
Employees required to handle or use poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances 
shall be instructed regarding the safe handling and use, and be made aware of the 
potential hazards, personal hygiene, and personal protective measures required.
1926.21(b)(4)
In job site areas where harmful plants or animals are present, employees who may be 
exposed shall be instructed regarding the potential hazards, and how to avoid injury, and 
the first aid procedures to be used in the event of injury.
1926.21(b)(5)
Employees required to handle or use flammable liquids, gases, or toxic materials shall 
be instructed in the safe handling and use of these materials and made aware of the 
specific requirements contained in Subparts D, F, and other applicable subparts of this 
part.
1926.21(b)(6)
1926.2 l(b)(6)(i)
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All employees required to enter into confined or enclosed spaces shall be instructed 
as to the nature of the hazards involved, the necessary precautions to be taken, and in the 
use of protective and emergency equipment required. The employer shall comply with 
any specific regulations that apply to work in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas.
1926.2 l(b)(6)(ii)
For purposes of paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, "confined or enclosed space" 
means any space having a limited means of egress, which is subject to the accumulation 
of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen deficient atmosphere. Confined or 
enclosed spaces include, but are not limited to, storage tanks, process vessels, bins, 
boilers, ventilation or exhaust ducts, sewers, underground utility vaults, turmels, 
pipelines, and open top spaces more than 4 feet in depth such as pits, tubs, vaults, and 
vessels.
OSHA has set the guidelines for safety on construction sites, as well as in other 
industries. However, it is the duty of employers to provide and ensure the training o f the 
workers. Employers must establish criteria, goals, and a plan of implementation on how 
the training of its workforce will be executed. Each safety training program shall be 
unique to the needs of that specific organization or operation to guarantee success. First, 
employers must establish who is in need of training. The answer is everyone needs 
formal training. All individuals that are involved in the organization must be educated on 
general jobsite training from those at top level management positions down to the 
individuals at the operational level. General safety training shall provide an in-depth 
understanding of all potential hazards that may occur while working on construction
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projects. Also, the training must provide individuals the competency on recognizing 
potential hazards and unsafe work practices. Training must also involve training that is 
specific to that particular project. Organizations must perform a job hazard analysis to 
pinpoint those existing or potential hazards that may occur. For example, if a crane is 
required during construction the organization is responsible for making sure all 
individuals are competent on crane safety and best practices.
No safety training program is effective without an established implementation effort 
by the organization. Fiori (2004) recognizes several methods that should be utilized to 
help in the implementation phase including: checklists, policy enforcement, and routine 
safety meetings. Checklists are a simple, inexpensive method of implementing safety on 
a project. The checklists allow workers, as well as managers, to routinely review rules, 
regulations, and procedures that are specific to the operations to be performed. Policy 
enforcement is a major component of safety training program that re-emphasizes the 
importance of management commitment to safety. No training program will be effective 
without the committed enforcement of those who regulate it. After training, employers 
must require workers to sign a contract acknowledging that they have received training 
and fully understand the expectations of the organization in regards to safety. At this 
point, policy enforcement is required by the organization to guarantee that individuals are 
performing safe practice during their routine operations. Finally, routine safety meetings 
must be conducted to “further enforce and bolster the safety commitment and culture on a 
job site” (Fiori, 2004). Meetings should be scheduled at the start o f the work week. This 
reiterates the notion that safety is the first priority of the organization; this suggests that
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safety should be considered before any other job task or activity.
3.4 Employee/Worker Involvement
As previously mentioned, the success of a construction safety culture relies on the 
commitment of management to establish and maintain safety within a system. However, 
the achievement of a construction safety culture requires the active participation o f all 
individuals within an organization, especially those at the operational level. In system 
dynamics modeling, worker involvement can be measured as the level o f commitment or 
participation of workers to the safety culture of their organization. This can be 
determined by survey, interview, or questiormaires. Workers may be asked to rate, using 
a 1-5 Likert scale, their commitment and the perceived commitment o f their peers to the 
construction safety culture of the organization.
Safety is the responsibility o f every person. One must not assume that someone else 
has taken their safety into consideration when they walk onto a construction project, so 
workers must become actively involved for their own benefit, as well as their colleagues. 
“Management must be willing to devolve some decision-making power to the workforce 
by allowing them to become actively involved in developing safety interventions and 
safety policy, rather than simply playing the more passive role of recipient” (Williamson 
et al., 1997). Providing the opportunities for worker involvement in decision making 
regarding safety also develops a trust relationship between management and operatives 
which will result in compliance with safety rules. Gamer (2004) suggests that employees 
who become actively involved in the safety program of their organization become 
stakeholders—they develop a sense of ownership for the success of the venture and
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support it. OSHA (2006) provides examples of active and meaningful participation that 
workers must perform to help establish the construction safety culture in their 
organization including:
• Participating in ad-hoc safety problem-solving programs
• Participating in accident and incident investigations
• Developing or participating in employee-involved suggestion programs
• Training other employees in safety
• Analyzing the job and/or processing hazards
• Acting as safety observers
• Serving on safety committees
Management commitment is at the helm of construction safety culture; however, if 
operatives do not “buy into” the safety program of the organization there will be 
devastating consequences. Failure of workers to actively participate in the program will 
lead to increased injuries and/or fatalities on any construction project.
3.5 Safety-Focused Planning and Design
It may be difficult to accept but, in regards to safety, some construction projects may 
be doomed from the very beginning. Why? Many owners, architects, designers, 
engineers, schedulers and all others involved in the planning and preconstruction phases 
of construction seldom take safety into account. Often the only concern with these 
individuals is cost, feasibility, and profit. Through technological advances including 
computer software such as AutoCad 3D and Revit, the designs of buildings and other 
structures continue to increase in complexity. Architects and engineers are designing
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buildings that are taller, and of varying geometrical shapes. Should we assume that when 
designing structure such as Las Vegas’ City Center or Dubai’s Burj Dubai that the design 
staff accounts for the safety of the individuals that will ultimately construct it? It is 
highly likely that safety was either considered very, very little or not at all. This is 
extremely troubling. To achieve a safety culture within a construction organization 
safety must be incorporated from the commencement o f pre-project planning. As 
mentioned previously, a system that possesses a safety culture is one in which safety is 
the first priority o f all individuals involved from top-level management to those at the 
operational level including, but not limited to owners, architects, engineers, general 
contractors, subcontractors, vendors, workers, etc. Whittington et al. (1992) illustrated 
how failures in project planning can eventually lead to accidents on construction sites in 
their model of construction industry accident causation. Effective planning and design 
for safety is essential if  projects are to be delivered on time, without cost overrun, and 
most importantly without accidents (Cameron and Duff, 1999).
How do we incorporate safety into the design and planning phases o f construction? 
Many designers and planners lack knowledge and experience to predict how their designs 
affect those individuals and the duties they perform on the project site. The International 
Labour Office (ILO) (1992) specifically states that designers should: receive training in 
health and safety; integrate the health and safety of construction workers into the design 
and plarming process; not include anything in the design which would necessitate the use 
of dangerous structural or other procedures or hazardous materials which could be 
avoided by the design modifications or by the substitute materials, and take into account 
the health and safety of workers during subsequent maintenance. Admittedly, this
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approach may seem rather far-fetched, but it is possible and will, in fact, result in 
decreases in accidents and fatalities on the job site. Safety-oriented design and plarming 
only requires a change or shift in focus from the design persormel. Architects and 
engineers must adopt new approaches in the design phase, which prioritizes safety before 
constructability, feasibility, production, etc.
The importance of effective plarming and design which incorporates safety as its’ first 
priority carmot be overemphasized. “The more significant the project design and 
management teams involvement is in the safety plarming effort, the greater the likelihood 
of positive outcomes for the project’s risk-control program” (Broderick, 2004). It is also 
important for design and plarming team to incorporate safety which is unique and ideal to 
that particular project in which they are working because every project design is different 
in some form. Incorporating safety into the design phase will eliminate those potentially 
risky hazards that workers may encounter before the onset o f construction. In the 
construction industry it is a known fact that the earlier problems, hazards, etc. are 
recognized and addressed in the construction process (entire) the more options the 
organizations have when exploring solutions. These options also tend to be much 
cheaper than they would during the construction phase. Therefore, design persormel 
including architects, engineers and managers should perform constructability reviews 
during the design phase to identify potential safety threats early on. The Construction 
Industry Institute (CII) based in Austin, Texas defines constructability as the optimum 
use of construction knowledge and experience in plarming, engineering, procurement, 
and field operations to achieve ultimate objectives (Jergeas and Van der Put, 2001). 
Constructability reviews will result in improved safety during the construction phase.
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Toole (2005) supports the increase of designers’ role in construction safety. In his study, 
Toole recognizes five tasks that civil design engineers may perform differently than the 
traditional duties of design professionals to contribute to construction safety. These tasks 
include: reviewing their designs, creating design documents, assisting the owner in 
procuring construction, reviewing submittals, and inspecting work in progress. Toole 
(2005) also list those barriers that prevent design engineers from adopting an increased 
involvement in safety including: lack of safety expertise, lack of understanding of the 
construction process, typical contract terms, and professional fees. It will be beneficial to 
the construction industry, as a whole, to educate design professionals on safety and 
construction processes just as construction managers may receive education and training 
on business management.
Gamabatese et. al (1997) addressed the much required need for incorporating safety 
into the design phase. Their research cited the lack of designers’ involvement in worker 
safety as being attributed to minimal education and experience in addressing safety on the 
construction site, and their attempt to minimize their liability exposure. In 1993 and 
1994, surveys were conducted on owners o f projects who responded on the role of 
designers’ consideration to safety in the design of the owners’ projects. Their responses 
supported data that unfortunately design professionals give much less consideration to 
safety than necessary to make a positive impact on construction safety. And, since 
OSHA places the responsibility o f safety on employers and not on design professionals 
they are even less motivated to prioritize safety. Figure 11 presents the breakdown of the 
results o f the survey. In fact, 45% of the interviewed owners admitted that worker safety 
was not taken into account during the design of their projects. Another 29% stated that
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safety was occasionally addressed in their designs depending on specific activities.
May address
safety i n future, -, Worker safety
10% not considered,
Worker safety is 45%
addressed, -  
16%
Occasionally 
address safety 
for specific 
items, 29%
Figure 11. Owners response regarding worker safety in design (Gambatese et ah, 1997)
To provide a reactive solution to this severe problem, Gambatese et. al (1997) 
developed software called the “Design for Construction Safety Toolbox” that aids 
designers in recognizing potential threats and hazards. Interviews were conducted from 
various professionals in the construction industry—owners, designers, project managers, 
workers, etc. They were asked to provide suggestions for designers to take into 
consideration when designing projects. These suggestions, in addition to information 
collected from best practice manuals and literature, were compiled into a computer 
database that the design professionals can reference during their work. Since the start of 
this research in 1994, Gamabatese and his colleagues have input over 400 suggestions 
into the safety design tool database. The tables 1 through 5 present the number of 
suggestions that were provided (via interview) categorized by design discipline, and the
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percentage of those suggestions that were incorporated into the “Design for Construction 
Safety Toolbox.”
Table 1 Design Suggestion Sources (Gambatese et al., 1997)
Number Source
Number o f  
Suggestions
% o f  
Recorded 
Suggestions
1 Safety Design Manuals and Checklists 140 32.6
2 Authors and Safety Taskforce Members 123 28.6
3 Interview (Telephone, in Person) 81 18.8
Constructors and Designers {50}
Academics {17}
Local/state/federal public agency
persormel {7}
Owners {5}
Designers {2}
4 OSHA (CFR, publications, data) 34 7.9
5 Journal articles 19 4.4
6 Periodicals 14 3.3
7 Public safety courses 8 1.9
Other ( NIOSH, HBR Constructability
8 Plan) 11 2.6
Total 430 100
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Table 2 Number of Suggestions Recorded by Discipline (Gambatese et al., 1997)
Number Design Disciplines
Number o f  Times 
Addressed
%of
Recorded
Suggestions
1 Structural 141 32.8
2 Architectural 127 29.5
3 Piping/plumbing 84 19.5
4 Electrical/instrumentation 69 16
5 Mechanical/HV AC 69 16
6 Construction management 62 14.4
7 Civil 48 11.2
8 Tanks/vessels 17 4
9 Traffic/transportation 16 3.7
10 Geotechnical 5 1.2
11 Coating/insulation 3 0.7
Total 641
*Since suggestions may address more than one design diseipline, the sum o f these numbers (expressed as 
%  o f  430 reeorded suggestions) exeeeds 100
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Table 3 Project Components Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambates et al.,
1997)
Number Project Component
Number o f  Times 
Addressed
%of
Recorded
Suggestions
1 Piping 77 17.9
2 Electrical/Instrumentation 58 13.5
3 Mechanical/HV AC 55 12.8
4 Structural framing 52 12.1
5 Stairs, ladder, ramp 43 10
6 Work schedule/sequence 41 9.5
7 Slab on grade, floor, roof 35 8.1
8 Roads, paving, flatwork 
General conditions/special
32 7.4
9 provisions 31 7.2
10 Earthwork, sewer, etc. 24 5.6
11 Furnishings, finishes 20 4.7
12 Structural plan/elevation 20 4.7
13 Door, window 19 4.4
14 Foundation 18 4.2
15 Project layout 16 3.7
16 Tank, vessel 16 3.7
17 Technical specifications 13 3
18 Walkway, platform 11 2.6
19 Contract drawings 10 2.3
20 Handrail, guardrail 
Total
10
601
2.3
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Table 4 Construction Site Hazards Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambatese 
et a l, 1997)
Number Construction Site Hazard
Number o f  Times 
Addressed
%of
Recorded
Suggestions
1 Falls 141 32.8
2 Electric shock 60 14
3 Explosions 57 13.3
4 Cave-in 56 13
5 Fire 42 9.8
6 Toxic Substances 38 8.8
7 Work area 34 7.9
8 Environmental/climate 31 7.2
9 Struck by objects 25 5.8
10 Vehicular traffic 25 5.8
11 Work issues 21 4.9
12 On-line equipment 20 4.7
13 Obstructions 18 4.2
14 Heavy equipment 13 3
15 Confined space 10 2.3
16 Caught in between 6 1.4
17 Lighting 5 1.2
Total 602
*Since suggestions may address more than one construction site hazard, the sum o f  these 
numbers (expressed as %  o f the 430 recorded suggestions) exceeds 100.
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Table 5 Project Systems Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambatese et
al., 1997)
Division Project System
Number o f  Times 
Addressed
% o f
Recorded
Suggestions
15 Mechanical 118 27.4
2 Sitework 69 16
10 Specialties 68 15.8
16 Electrical 58 13.5
1 General Conditions 51 11.9
5 Metal 30 7
3 Concrete 26 6
8 Doors and windows 19 4.4
11 Equipment 19 4.4
13 Special construction 16 3.7
6 Wood and plastics 12 2.8
9 Finishes 8 1.9
7 Thermal and moisture protection 6 1.4
4 Masonry 4 0.9
14 Conveying systems 3 0.7
12 Furnishings 2 0.5
Total 509
*Since suggestions may address more than one project system, the sum o f  these 
numbers (expressed as %  o f  the 430 recorded suggestions) exceeds 100.
If used effectively by design professionals, the tool by Gambatese et. al (1997) can 
have a tremendous positive impact on the safety culture of the organizations which utilize 
it. In system dynamics modeling the factor, safety-oriented designs can be measured by 
the number o f hours spent by architects, designers, and engineers reviewing their designs 
and incorporating the use of CII/Gambatese model “Design for Construction Safety 
Toolbox.” Now that the lack of training and education has been addressed with this tool, 
we must now aim to alter the mentalities o f designers in which they, themselves, take
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more responsibility and liability of their designs on the individuals that have to construct 
them.
Scheduling is another aspect of construction that occurs in the planning phases in 
which safety should be incorporated to target and account for those activities that may 
pose potential threats to workers when construction has begun. In system dynamics 
modeling the factor safety-oriented planning and scheduling can be measured as amount 
o f additional hours allocated to those construction activities that pose increased threats of 
accidents during the construction process. In addition to designers and engineers, 
schedulers should also receive training on safety and construction processes to leam 
which activities have increased hazards or risks. Yi and Langford (2006) presented a 
theory of safety planning method which estimates the risk distribution of a project and 
helps the safety manager to both estimate situations of concentrated risk and then 
reschedule activities when necessary. This method requires coordination between the 
scheduler and the safety manager to eliminate the occurrence of activities before the 
construction phase. Experience and knowledge of past projects is also a prerequisite for 
safety-focused scheduling. If various activities caused hazardous situations on past 
projects, then these activities should be identified, evaluated, and incorporated into the 
scheduling o f future projects.
There has been significant research that has identified the benefits of incorporating 
safety into the planning, design, and scheduling phases of construction. Kartam (1997) 
discussed the introduction of safety measures into construction plans using critical path 
method (CPM) techniques. Tam et al. (2001) devised a method of allocating resources 
according to their order o f priority after comparing safety improvement measures
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developed in the construction industry, Saurin et al. (2004) developed a safety planning 
and control model which integrated safety management with production planning and 
control. Incorporating scheduling and safety is a requirement for achieving a 
construction safety culture.
Many accidents in the construction industry are attributed to human error. Production 
pressures often lead individuals to “cut comers” or engage in hazardous behaviors 
(failure to tie-off, working without PPE, operating without clearance, etc.) to make up for 
time. In due time, these hazardous behaviors eventually result in injuries and/or fatalities. 
If workers, as well as organizations, compare the time lost while taking necessary safety 
precautions to the time lost during the occurrence of an accident the workers may think 
twice before “cutting corners” and the organizations will be more strict on allowing these 
hazardous behaviors. If hazards can be identified early on and the adequate time and 
resources are allocated to the activities in the scheduling phase then delays caused by 
accidents will be, more than likely, eliminated.
The importance o f safety focused scheduling must not be underestimated. Accidents 
resulting in injury and fatalities can have uncontrollable and often irreversible impacts on 
a project’s schedule. When accidents occur, especially those serious in nature, projects 
tend to come to halt. Accidents result in lost time and productivity. The situation will 
affect the morale o f the organization which will cause workers to either slow down or 
stop work altogether. That particular area of the job site may be temporarily closed down 
for investigation. All in all, the project’s efficient production is severely affected and 
typically results in the project being behind schedule. Once a schedule is behind it is 
often difficult to get back on track. Therefore, taking the necessary steps to incorporate
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safety into the scheduling process is beneficial for the entire system.
3.6 Accident Reporting and Investigation System
Accident reporting and investigation systems are an integral part o f any safety 
management program, and this system must exist to establish a safety culture within an 
organization. In system dynamics modeling, accident reporting and investigation system 
can be measured by the number of times the accident reporting and investigation system 
was used during a construction project or a specified time period. It is the responsibility 
of management to establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement 
systems. Without a reporting system, there is no way to measure and assess the state of 
the systems safety.
The objective of the reporting system is to not only monitor accident rates, but to 
identify accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect o f site safety initiatives, 
and to estimate the costs of accidents (Rowlinson, 2004). A safety reporting system is 
another activity that requires continuous, active participation of all members within an 
organization from top level management to the operational level. Many times 
construction accidents go unreported for various reasons. Workers may not report 
accidents because they may feel that their position may be jeopardized; they may feel that 
the lack of severity did not require the reporting o f an accident; they sometimes feel that 
the company will require them to take time off, etc. Construction companies may fail to 
report an accident for fear of insurance increases. Whatever the case, no excuse is valid 
for failure to report any accident that occurs on the project site. Cooke and Rohleder
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(2006) states that the fraction of incidents reported is dependent on the personal 
commitment to safety of the workers who observe or are involved in the incidents.
Reporting systems reveal valuable information on the status of an organizations 
safety culture, and allows progress within the organization to be tracked over time. 
Rowlinson (2004) states that the role of the reporting system in an organization is to 
reduce the occurrence of accidents by analyzing and reporting on accident causation and 
highlighting areas where action is needed. Highlighting these areas where action is 
needed requires thorough investigations on the part of management. Again, the notion of 
management’s commitment to safety comes into play. If management is committed to 
the construction safety culture of their organization they will be willing to perform 
thorough investigations to identify errors in their safety program for future prevention. 
The goal o f investigations is to collect as much information about the accidents as 
possible. These investigations must not only investigate those unsafe acts or behaviors 
that caused the accident, but most importantly, those root causes that provided the 
opportunity for those unsafe acts to exist. The information may collected by performing 
a site examination, performing interviews with witnesses, etc. Organizations must leam 
from the information collected from reporting and investigation system to maintain and 
enhance the safety culture within their environments.
3.7 Safety Investment
When thinking of safety investment, what comes to mind is the slogan, “if you do not 
put anything into the bank, then you will not get anything out.” In system dynamics 
modeling, safety investment can be measured as the amount o f dollars a construction
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organization spends annually on safety resources including: safety personnel (safety 
managers, officers, etc), safety equipment, and safety training and promotions. There is 
no secret to success when it pertains to safety. The fact is that those organizations which 
possess a construction safety culture and have stellar records when it comes to safety 
have invested a substantial amount of resources (both time and money) into their safety 
programs. Tang et al. (1997) identifies the three components o f safety investment as:
(a) Safety administration personnel
Site staff and head office staff; safety officers and safety supervisors on site to 
monitor safety-related matters.
Some large contractors will employ safety manager/senior safety officers to 
direct and coordinate safety staff.
The salary o f these personnel and their supporting staff are part o f the 
investment.
(b) Safety equipment
Purchasing of safety boots, goggles, safety fences, first-aid facilities, etc. 
which are related to safety on the site.
(c) Safety training and promotion
Safety training courses are organized by contractors for their employees 
Safety promotion includes the printing of pamphlets and posters, the 
production of safety advertising banners and boards, organization of safety 
campaign and monetary rewarding of individual workers who achieve a god 
safety standard of work, etc.
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An organization’s safety investment should be directly proportional to its safety 
performance, and vice versa. The underlying theme of construction safety culture is 
management’s commitment. The routine presence of safety personnel on a construction 
site emphasizes that level of commitment that an organization places on safety. It is 
unfortunate that companies must invest hundreds of thousands or possibly millions of 
dollars to achieve safety culture within their organizations; however, it is reality. As 
unfortunate as it may appear, many operatives do not prioritize their own safety when 
working in the field. They tend to overestimate their skills and abilities in performing 
their trade, and they underestimate potential hazards and dangers that they face when they 
enter construction sites. It is also unfortunate that the occupations of safety officers, 
safety managers, etc. exist predominantly to pose as constant reminders to workers that 
their safety is first priority. In the absence of safety personnel, many individuals only 
prioritize production. Therefore, organizations must invest in people to monitor and 
ensure that workers are complying with safety regulations.
A substantial amount of an organization’s investment on their safety program must be 
allocated to proper, updated safety equipment for workers. This not only includes 
personal protective equipment (PPE)— safety goggles, hard hats, gloves, etc., but also 
state-of-the art machinery and tools designed and guaranteed to decrease the risk of 
worker injuries and fatalities on construction sites. One way o f addressing safety issues 
on site is to provide irmovative technological solutions to problems. Outdated and poor- 
quality equipment has been the direct cause o f many construction accidents, historically. 
Construction organizations must be willing to take advantage o f the modern, 
technological advancements in construction equipment.
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The major reasons companies lack much of the proper tools and equipment is cost. 
Management’s commitment to safety culture is once again revisited. As mentioned time 
after time, most organizations prioritize profit and productivity over safety. The goal of 
companies is to get the greatest possible return on investment. The profit margin in the 
construction industry is typically very low with most organizations making an average of 
1% to 3% profit on any given project. So, some companies take unnecessary risks by 
providing their employees with the “bare minimum,” sub-standard and outdated 
equipment that will get the job done.
Modem construction equipment, in fact, is very expensive; however, investing in 
innovative equipment or even renting it is a win-win situation for construction 
companies. Not only will companies get increased safety performance but increased 
productivity performance as well. And, when comparing the cost o f equipment purchase 
or rental to the phenomenal cost that injuries and fatalities have on organizations resource 
investment on safety is, without a doubt, the most logical decision to make. The fact is 
that the majority o f construction companies are not those large “powerhouse” 
corporations that are featured in the Engineering News Record Magazine (ENR). Most 
constmction organizations are relatively small and their net worth is typically not that 
high. The point is—the average company, although insured, cannot withstand the impact 
of a serious accident on a constmction project. An unfortunate fatality, with a valued 
cost of $4 million according to the CPWR (2007), will likely force the average 
construction company out o f business. Therefore, resource investment in safety culture is 
critical for survival in the constmction industry. Technological advancements in 
construction equipment addresses the number one concern o f most organizations
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worldwide—how to get more production without jeopardizing the safety of the 
workforce. Resource investment is the key.
By now, it is evident that safety culture at the surface level is very basic and simple to 
achieve. As mentioned before, it is unfortunate that much of the effort exerted on 
achieving construction safety culture revolves around “babysitting,” for a lack of better 
words. This opinion may be rather extreme; however, it is reality. Construction safety 
culture entails posing a constant reminder to all individuals within a system that safety is 
the first priority. One form of reiterating safety to workers on a construction site is 
through safety training and promotions. Training has been addressed earlier in this 
thesis. Promoting safety through banners, posters, pamphlets, etc. is an inexpensive 
method of advertising an organization’s stance on the safety culture. It also gives the 
workers a constant reminder of the rules and regulations that they have agreed upon 
before beginning work on the project. Organizations must take any and every measure 
possible to promote the safety culture within their organizations. The impact of 
promotions material will have many positive impacts on the construction safety culture of 
an organization.
3.8 Contractor/ Sub-Contractor Selection
To achieve construction safety culture within a system every company and individual 
must be on board with safety as their main objective while completing the project. 
Therefore, owners and general contractors must be stricter in selecting contractors and 
sub-contractors to perform work on their projects. Besides, owners and general 
contractors do have an economic stake in the safety performance of subcontractors due to
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required insurance coverage for workers during the construction process, i.e. owner- 
controlled insurance programs or contractor controlled insurance programs. Recall that 
culture is defined as shared values, goals, and beliefs within a group or system. The key 
word is shared. It is highly unlikely if  not impossible to achieve a construction safety 
culture within a system if the sub-contractors do not share the values or beliefs in safety 
as the owner of the project or the general contractor. All parties involved must have the 
same vision or philosophy in regards to safety. To ensure that specialty contractors and 
sub-contractors share the same vision of construction safety culture, both owners (clients) 
and general contractors must implement a selective prequalification or screening process. 
This is accomplished by reviewing the contractor’s past safety history or experience 
modification rate. Emmons (2006) states that the following information should be 
reviewed from the past three years of the company: OSHA recordable rates (now referred 
to as incident rate), lost work day rate, and obtain references from most recent clients.
The experience modification rate (EMR) is a system designed to determine a 
company’s premiums for worker’ compensation insurance. The rating takes into account 
the compensation losses for an organization’s type of work and amount of payroll, and 
predicts the cost of expected losses to be paid by that employer within a three-year rating 
period. The EMR is calculated according to the following formula
EMR = ---------------- 77——--- T—̂ —r— Y—-— 7— r  ---------\
PL, + B V  + {{e l  -  P L ,)x  W V )+ {l-  W V)x {EL -  P L ,)
where B V is  the ballast value, EL expected losses, IL actual incurred losses, PL a is the 
actual primary losses, PLe is the expected primary losses, and WV is the weighting value. 
The rating is then compared to other companies who perform the same type of work to
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develop an experience rating. Lower rates are equivalent to fewer accidents occurring 
in the three year rating period.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) requires employers to record and
report accident information on an Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Annual Survey
Form known as the OSHA 300 log which must be retained for a minimum of five years
(Beaujon and Everett, 2004). The information on the contractor’s log includes: number
of fatalities, number of injuries and illnesses involving lost work days, number of injuries
and illnesses involving restricted work days, number of days away from work, number of
day of restricted work activity, number of injuries and illnesses without lost work days.
To obtain the OSHA-recordable incident rate calculate the total number o f fatalities,
injuries, illnesses involving lost and restricted work days, and injuries and illnesses
without lost work days. Incidents are simply defined as individual occurrences or events.
This number (No. of incidents) is then multiplied by 200,000 hours, and then divided by
the total number of employee hours worked during that year:
, . , „ Number o f  incidents x 200,000 hours
Incident Rate = --------------------------------------------------
Number o f  hours worked
The 200,000 hours represents the standard base for incident rates which is equal to 100 
employees working 40 hours per week for 50 weeks out o f the year. Reviewing a 
company’s OSHA recordable incident rates provide owners and general contractors with 
a very accurate representation of how safely workers from that sub-contractor will 
perform, as w ell as comply with safety regulations on future projects. It also serves as a 
model for management’s level o f commitment to safety within that organization. If an 
organization has high incidence rate, it is safe to assume that a construction safety culture 
is non-existent and the prioritization o f safety is very minimum.
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Owners and general contractors must establish higher standards for the companies 
that they choose to perform work for them. The reason that the construction industry 
has such high injury and fatality rates is because of mixed priorities. The only factor that 
management generally takes into consideration is cost. Companies want the most for 
less—the majority of contracts in this business are awarded to the lowest bidder. It is 
standard industry practice to select the lowest, competent bidder; however, the 
competency of the specialty or subcontractor is usually overlooked or not emphasized 
because o f prioritization on the low bid that they may have submitted. A popular phrase 
that pertains to this discussion of contractor selection is “you get what you pay for!” 
Owners and general contractors responsible for selecting specialty or subcontractors 
have two alternatives: they can either pay more in the earlier phases o f the construction 
process by selecting a bidder who shares the same value and commitment to safety as 
they do, or pay more later in workers’ compensation, lawsuits, etc. as a result o f selecting 
the lowest bidder who places no importance on the construction safety culture of their 
organization. “As a contractor’s safety focus and execution decreases, the owner’s costs 
increase. If an owner chooses to work with select, safer contractors, then the owners’ 
costs will be significantly less. Owners who pay attention to contractor safety records 
experience fewer third-party lawsuits and get more efficient execution of their work” 
(Beaujon and Smith, 2004). All decisions made early on during the pre-construction 
phases of a project will significantly impact cost once construction has begun.
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Systems Thinking
Systems thinking can be viewed in many fashions— as a concept or idea, as an 
approach or study, or as a tool to create a better understanding. Whichever way it is 
viewed, the objective o f system thinking is very “cut and dry”—to provide a clear 
understanding to complex, real world problems and situations by examining systems 
holistically. Everything around us makes up some kind of system which means that all 
things in an environment have some kind of connection between them. As human beings, 
it is in our nature to solve problems by dissecting them into smaller pieces and analyzing 
various aspects individually. This approach may work for very simple problems, but 
when we destroy the connection between system components by breaking them down 
into smaller parts we run the risk o f losing valuable, or possibly latent, information about 
that system that may have provided a better understanding or solution. Systems thinking, 
as defined by Sherwood (2002), is the study o f the connectedness between those systems’ 
component parts whether they be human beings, departments, or indeed businesses and 
organizations, as a whole. To gain the understanding of complex systems it is imperative 
that we maintain the connectedness o f system components, and study the system in its 
entirety. There are two tools used in systems thinking that provides a better 
understanding; (1) causal loop diagrams, which describe complex systems in terms of
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cause-and effect relationships, and (2) system dynamics modeling which allows the 
behavior o f system components to be evaluated over time in computer simulations. 
Sherwood (2002) presents the many benefits o f using system thinking as a tool for 
understanding including:
• Systems thinking can help you tame the complexity o f real-world problems by 
providing a structured way o f balancing a broad, complete view with the selection 
of the right o f detail.
• Causal loop diagrams—a visual method of capturing this now-tamed complexity— 
are a powerful means of communication, and their use can ensure that as wide a 
community as you wish has a genuinely, and deeply, shared view. This is 
enormously valuable in building high-performing teams.
• Causal loop diagrams can also help you identify the wisest way of influencing the 
system of interest. As a result, you can avoid taking poor decisions, for example 
decisions that look like fixes but are likely to backfire.
• System dynamics modeling is a computer modeling technique that allows you to 
simulate how a complex system, as expressed as a causal loop diagram, is likely 
to evolve over time. This provides you with a “laboratory of the future,” so that 
you can test likely consequences o f actions, decisions, or policies before you are 
obliged to commit.
• Overall, systems thinking can help you take decisions that pass the most stringent 
test there is—the test of time.
As mentioned throughout this thesis, many critics believe that safety culture is just a 
“catch-all” fad that cannot realistically be achieved on projects in the construction
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industry. Much o f the skepticism on this topic may be contributed to pass researchers’ 
failure to precisely define those steps that organizations must take to establish safety 
culture on a construction project or any other system. Past research has attempted to 
explain safety (or lack of) by dissecting and examining the various factors or variables. 
This is our instinctual behavior as humans. It is assumed that when things are broken 
down into component parts it is easier to gather the information or insight that we are 
seeking about what it is that we are studying. “Taking a complex, dynamic, and circular 
world and linearizing it into a set o f snapshots may make things seem simpler, but we 
may totally misread the very reality we were seeking to understand” (Kim, 1994). 
Systems thinking suggest that all the answers we are in search of are best revealed by 
studying systems in their entirety. Creating a system thinking model will provide an 
objective analysis of the connectedness or cause-and-effect relationships between all 
factors required to achieve a construction safety culture.
4.2 Cause-and-Effect Relationships
In system thinking, cause-and-effect relationships are presented in the form of a 
diagram known as the causal loop diagram. The diagram consists of all factors or 
variables that make up the system in which we are studying. The relationships between 
variables are represented by arrows and may be given the designation of positive (+) or 
negative (-) depending on the type of relationship. Positive relationships are those in 
which the factors are going the in same direction. Figure 12 represents a positive causal 
relationship between corporate-level and project-level management’s commitment.
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Figure 12. Positive causal relationship between corporate level and project level 
management’s commitment
Negative relationships are going in the opposite direction. For example, as 
management’s commitment to safety increases, injuries decrease. The arrow representing 
the relationship between management commitment and accidents will be denoted with a 
sign. Figure 13 represents a negative causal relationship between management 
commitment to safety and number of injuries.
management 
commitment to safety
mjunes
Figure 13. Negative causal relationship between management commitment and 
number of injuries.
All causal loop diagrams have one central feature in common which is known as the 
feedback loop. Feedback loops imply that all factors or variables in the diagram are 
connected in some way. “Feedback manifests itself in causal loop diagrams by the 
presence of one or more continuous, closed loops: loops representing chains of causality 
that link back on themselves, loops with no beginning and no end, and loops in which
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everything is ultimately connected to everything else” (Sherwood, 2002). Henceforth, 
construction safety culture is a feedback loop. Feedback loops can be divided into two 
distinct chains of causality known as reinforcing and balancing loops. A feedback loop is 
known as reinforcing if the number of negatives (-) in that complete loop are even, and 
classified as balancing loops if the number of negatives (-) in the loop is an odd number. 
In reinforcing loops, feedback increases the impact of change and in balancing loops the 
causal relationship between variables keeps the system in equilibrium.
For this exploratory study Vensim, a modeling program, is used to create a 
qualitative mental model of how safety culture can be achieved in a construction system. 
“Vensim, the Ventana Simulation environment, is an integrated framework for 
conceptualizing, building, simulating, analyzing, optimizing, and deploying models of 
dynamic systems” (www.ventanasvstemsinc.comI. Using modeling software to 
understand safety related topics is not a new approach. Howell and Obren (2005) used 
Powersim to investigate the validity of their approach to develop an understanding o f the 
interaction of safety policies with the school bus environment in New Zealand. Milrad 
(2002) suggests using STELLA, Powersim, StarLogo, and Agentsheets as ideal modeling 
tools and programs which enable users to develop better intuitions about the mechanisms 
that govern dynamic interactions. In their study o f the space shuttles Columbia and 
Challenger accidents, Dulac et al. (2005) performed a 200-run Monte Carlo sensitivity 
simulation to investigate the effects o f their model, the Independent Technical Authority 
structure, on NASA. DYNAMO was the modeling tool of choice in Nuthmann’s (1994) 
research o f the use o f human judgment in system dynamics models o f social systems. 
DYNAMO was the first system dynamics modeling software and was developed by Jay
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Forester at the, then newly founded, Sloan School of Management at the Massachutsett 
Institute of Technology. Details of DYNAMO  may be found in Richardson and Pugh 
(1981). DYNAMO is no longer used due to the advent of advanced, micro-computer 
based programs such as STELLA, Vensim, Powersim, Berkely Madonna, Mystrategy, 
AnyLogic, etc. For the purposes of this exploratory study, Vensim was chosen various 
reasons: (1) it is easy to use for first-time and experienced modelers, (2) it provides a 
practical way of communicating how complex systems function, (3) allows the 
simulation of systems over time, bridges the gap between theory and real world, 
demonstrates changes and predicts outcomes within a system, (4) the program has built- 
in functions which automatically produce mathematical, statistical, and logical data, and 
(5) provides sensitivity analysis which reveal which sectors of the construction safety 
system may potentially be in jeopardy, and (6) it was cost efficient— Vensim allows a free 
downloadable version to be used for educational purpose in comparisons to other 
programs that cost anywhere from two hundred to thousands of dollars.
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Figure 14. Systems thinking model of construction safety culture.
Figure 14 represents the systems thinking model of construction safety culture 
developed by this research. This model provides a visual or mental representation of 
those factors requisite to achieving a construction safety culture in addition to other 
factors that are either directly or indirectly related to the safety in complex systems. The 
model was constructed in group model building sessions that involved Dr. David Shields, 
Prof. Neil Opfer, and myself. In our group model building sessions, “group think” style 
brainstorming was used to come to a consensus on which factors were most relevant to 
achieving a construction safety culture and the causal relationships or interconnectedness 
that exist among them. It is important to remember that systems thinking models are
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closed systems that have no definite starting point and no ending point. There are many 
factors within this model that share more than one relationship. This is typical of system 
dynamics modeling—to gain the insight or answers to the hidden problems, we must 
study and exhaust all possibilities for relatedness between variables. It is the objective of 
this thesis that this model will add clarity to the concept o f construction safety culture and 
express how it can be achieved.
As mentioned earlier, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving 
safety in construction organizations. By top-down approach it is not meant that a 
commitment must come from only those individuals that are directly involved in the day- 
to-day construction activities, but also those individuals such as the owner/client possess 
the ultimate power to make impacts on a construction project. Having this ultimate 
power means that the owner possesses the initial capability of making safety first priority 
and establishing it as a culture on his/her project to be constructed. Although 
management commitment is the foundation of construction safety culture, the top-down 
approach suggests that the initial commitment should come from the owner or client. 
Historically, this has been the first obstacle to achieving safety on construction projects. 
Why? The answer is cost.
Cost has always been the driving force in the construction industry. Owners/clients 
want the most for their money. They want the most elaborate buildings that can be built 
and they want them for the lowest price that they can obtain. So, often they award 
contracts to the bidder with the lowest prices and seldom take any other criteria or 
qualifications into account i.e. EMR, OSHA-recordable incidents, etc. This lowest cost 
mentality is particularly prevalent in public works projects. Awarding contracts to the
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lowest bidder frequently does not result in being the less expensive route for owners or 
contractors. However, this method is persistent even though its’ weaknesses and 
disadvantages are well known and recognized. Through owner-controlled insurance 
programs, accidents on jobsites, and workmen’s compensation claims, owners in some 
way or another, always have a financial stake in the safety of their projects. It is to their 
best interest to pre-qualify potential bidders and have a set o f established criteria, 
especially safety-related criteria, that organizations must meet to perform work for that 
owner/client.
The first causal relationships that exist in this system thinking model is the between 
“owner/client commitment to safety, contractor/suh-contractor selection criteria, and 
corporate level management commitment to safety.” The system thinking model states 
that there is a positive causal relationship between the owner/client commitment to safety 
and the contractor/sub-contractor selection criteria. The model states that as 
owners/clients commitment to safety increases the number of pre-qualifying criteria 
involved in selecting the appropriate contractor increases. Owners have the ability to 
positively or negatively influence the safety o f their projects during the selection of their 
contractors. Bids are generally awarded to the lowest, competent bidder. However, as 
safety data and research suggests that many contractors lack competency in recognizing 
the importance of safety in the construction process. Owners/clients neglect safety for 
the same reasons that contractors performing the work do— it is because they view safety 
as an overhead expense rather than an investment and eventually a cost saving benefit.
To owners, as well as the organizations that construct their projects, safety is believed to 
be an expense that does not directly yield profits— hence, overhead. Many are ignorant
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of the direct positive impacts that safety has on productivity. Productivity is an important 
factor in the profitability of constructing a project. Safety programs are similar to having 
automobile insurance— everyone dreads paying into it them until an accident occurs, then 
we are fortunate that we made the investment. It has been noted that a major shift in 
priorities must occur to achieve a zero-accident philosophy that the industry has longed 
for. Owners, too, must place safety at the front of their projects. As owners establish the 
commitment to construction safety culture, corporate level management of construction 
firms will then be forced to establish this same commitment if  they want to obtain the 
contracts.
Another causal relationship that is critical to the success o f a safety culture on 
construction projects is between the owner/client commitment to safety culture and 
design professionals commitment to safety culture. As previously mentioned, the 
owner/client has the ultimate power to positively or negatively impact the safety culture 
on their prospective project. Owners have the ability to select architects and engineers 
that emphasize the importance of safety in their designs— i.e. those design professionals 
that consult the CII “Design for Safety Toolbox.” Addressing safety at this level is 
believed to have the potential for a positive impact on the safety culture o f the system 
because this is the first opportunity that is provided to control potential safety hazards 
that may occur once construction as commenced. Historically, architects and engineers 
have been reluctant to become entangled in construction safety aspects when designing 
projects. Their main reason for avoiding involvement in the safety aspect o f a 
construction project is it exposes them to unnecessary liability.
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The entire project delivery system will need to be completely changed if risk sharing 
for safety among all parties is to be obtained. Without this paradigm shift, architects and 
engineers will continue to avoid liability associated with construction safety, and 
rightfully so. The goal is to create a construction safety culture, and not just make safety 
a priority but a shared value. Cultures fail when individuals do not accept the 
responsibilities that have been collectively established by the group. The systems 
thinking model illustrates a positive causal relationship—-as the owner/client’s 
commitment to safety increases, industry design professionals’ commitment to safety 
should also increase. If owners make a commitment to safety-oriented designs, and 
financially accept the cost of increased liability for architects and engineers, architects 
and engineers will more likely participate in the construction safety culture. This 
commitment will, in turn, reinforce management’s commitment to safety.
Management commitment to safety is the foundation to which construction safety is 
based upon. No safety program, or any other program for that matter, will be successful 
without the full support and commitment of both corporate management and project-level 
management. “A well designed management system can help to reduce incidents along 
with the associated hidden costs; increase efficiency; improve productivity, morale, and 
quality of products; and reduce the potential for regulatory citations” (Roughton & 
Mercurio, 2002). Although the appropriate starting point for this systems thinking model 
is the owner/client’s commitment to safety, the commitment of management to safety is 
the driving force o f the culture. Skeptics o f safety culture question whether or not 
management commitment has that much of an impact on the success of a safety program.
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It is management’s duty to, not only develop the safety culture which is ideal for its 
organization, but to develop one in which implementation comes from active 
participation. Active participation of management provides the motivation for those at 
the operational level to participate in the safety program. In my systems thinking model, 
there is a positive relationship between the commitment of corporate and project-level 
management. As the commitment o f corporate level management to construction safety 
culture of their organization increase, the commitment o f the project-level management 
will also increase. There are many ways that both corporate and project-level 
management can demonstrate their commitment visibly to other members o f their system. 
Roughton & Mercurio (2002) states some methods that management can utilize to display 
their commitment:
• Getting out where you can be seen, informally or through formal inspections
• Being accessible
• Being an example, by knowing and following the rules that employees are 
expected to follow
• Being involved by participating on the workplace safety and health committee
• Conducting frequent inspections with selected employees
When it comes to safety, management must lead by example. As mentioned before, 
management cannot expect its workforce to comply with jobsite safety regulations if  they 
do not, themselves, display a commitment to those regulations. We often see top level 
management walking around construction sites without their PPE. This makes a 
statement to the entire organization suggesting that safety is not a priority. For a safety
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culture to exist, the beliefs and values have to he shared among all individuals within that 
system. Safety is the responsibility of everyone in the organization.
There is also a positive causal relationship that exists between corporate-level 
management’s commitment to safety culture and the project scheduler’s commitment to 
safety culture. As management’s commitment to construction safety culture increases, 
project scheduler’s commitment to safety should also increase. One o f the most 
important aspects of any construction project is effective planning and scheduling. 
Scheduling impacts all areas of construction including; safety, costs, productivity, 
profitability, etc. Most activities involved in construction pose some kind of risk of 
illness and/or injury to workers, but some activities greater than others. Certain activities 
that pose increased threats to workers require additional time to perform those activities 
safely and efficiently. If safety is taken into consideration during the scheduling phase of 
a project and additional time is provided for various activities that are more dangerous, 
then workers will be able to work efficiently and cautiously when working. When 
projects get behind schedule for various reasons, workers tend to work faster and cut 
comers in regards to safe working practices. Effective safety-oriented scheduling is the 
solution. Safety is as just as much the responsibility of project schedulers as it is any 
other member of the construction project.
Corporate-level management may also express its commitment to safety culture by 
providing the necessary resources to achieve the goals and objectives o f the safety 
program. In the systems thinking model there is a positive causal relationship between 
corporate management’s commitment to safety culture and their investment on safety 
programs. As corporate level management’s commitment to safety increases, the amount
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of resources that they invest in their safety program will also increase. Resource 
investment in safety programs may come in many forms. Management may invest 
financial resources in their training programs for both workers and project level 
management. Financial investment may be allocated to the hiring of various safety 
professionals i.e. safety managers, safety officers, and administrative support. Also, 
safety investment results in the purchase or rental of modem advanced constmction 
equipment that has state-of-the-art safety features.
The systems thinking model indicates a positive causal relationship between safety 
investment and various safety resources. As investment in safety increases, the number 
of safety professionals hired into the organization increases, in addition to the increase in 
the number of modem, technologically advanced pieces of construction equipment a 
company uses— either owned or rented. It is important to mention that all o f these factors 
have begun via management’s commitment to safety. If you have a sufficient number of 
safety professionals assigned to a job site this will also increase enforcement of OSHA 
regulations on the jobsite. The systems thinking model illustrates that there is a positive 
relationship that exists between the number of safety professionals assigned to a 
construction project and enforcement of OSHA regulations.
To enforce and comply with OSHA regulations, safety professionals will increase its 
use of accident reporting and investigation systems. It is the responsibility of safety 
personnel to establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement system. 
Organizations are required, legally, to report on all accidents that occur during work 
performance. However, organizations have a greater need for accident reporting and 
investigation systems. “This need is based on the reporting of accidents for insurance
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premium calculation purposes and also as part of the safety management system to 
reduce the occurrence o f accidents by analyzing and reporting on accident causation and 
highlighting areas where action is needed” (Rowlinson, 2004). As mentioned before, the 
objective of the reporting system is to not only monitor accident rates, but to identify 
accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect of site safety initiatives, and to 
estimate the costs of accidents. Reporting and investigation systems are another means of 
checking the safety status of the organization. Ultimately, as the use of accident 
reporting and investigation systems increase, the system should experience a decrease in 
the number of accidents on the construction project. This negative causal relationship is 
illustrated in the systems thinking model. Safety investment is another way that 
management’s commitment to construction safety culture is visibly demonstrated.
There is probably no better way to provide the knowledge of safe working practices 
and hazard recognition than through effective training programs. Training programs 
should be provided for both management and labor. Training programs will vary 
throughout various organizations according to their needs and objectives. However, 
workers should be provided, at a minimum, an OSHA 10-hour training course in safety 
and jobsite hazard recognition or equivalent. Many construction companies require that 
their management level employees receive the 30-hour OSHA safety training or 
equivalent. As mentioned earlier in the text, there are three common types o f training; 
induction training, refresher training, and ongoing training. Management can 
demonstrate their commitment to safety culture by paying for the various types of 
training as hours worked. This will emphasize to workers that safety is the main
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objective and the organization is willingly to make a financial investment in insuring the 
safety of its workforce.
Although safety is the responsibility of all within the system, safety should still be 
reiterated with the presence of safety personnel. The investment in safety personnel 
including safety managers, officers, and administration demonstrates that an organization 
is willing to increase efforts to insure the success of their safety program. Implementing 
any program and especially developing a safety culture is a difficult task to achieve. It is 
a job that should be given special attention by individuals who have been trained or 
educated in safety. “Training is more complicated than telling or showing someone how 
to perform a task. Training is the transfer of specific knowledge to trainees in such a way 
that the trainees accept and use the knowledge in the performance of their jobs.” 
(Roughton and Mercurio, 2002). In the system thinking model, as the number of safety 
personnel increases, the amount of training including induction, refresher, and ongoing 
training will also increase. There is a positive causal relationship between the number of 
safety personnel that management has invested in with the amount of training that the 
workforce receives from its employer.
Training o f our workforce cannot be emphasized enough. It is much less expensive 
to provide workers the necessary training they need to perform tasks safely and 
efficiently than to pay medical bills as a result of injuries caused by lack of training and 
experience. Lack of training has been attributed to the cause of many accidents that have 
been cited as “human error,” in which an individual’s negligent actions were the primary 
cause o f the accident. Refresher training is one method o f improving human error in the
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construction industry. Refresher training reinforces and reiterates the safe practices and 
precautions that will increase workers’ safety and well-being on construction sites.
In the systems thinking model, human error has a positive causal relationship with 
accidents. As human error action on the job site increases, the number of accidents will 
also increase. The same positive relationship also exists with a decrease in human 
error— as human error decrease, the number o f accidents caused will likely experience a 
decrease. In the systems thinking model training has positive causal relationships with 
both safety knowledge o f workers and their commitment to the safety culture of their 
organization. There is no question that employee training significantly enhances the level 
of safety knowledge of workers. In the model, as training o f the workforce increases, the 
average safety knowledge of the workforce and their commitment to the safety culture 
also increase. As a result of both corporate and project management level’s visible 
commitment to safety, those individuals at the operational level will develop an inherent 
commitment to safety. When management “sets the tone” by visibly demonstrating their 
commitment, workers will be motivated to follow or practice the same culture of the 
organization.
The next major causal relationships that exist within this systems thinking model of 
construction safety culture revolves around the factor ‘productivity.’ Acquiring the 
proper, modern equipment for employees to perform tasks efficiently and safely is 
another major demonstration of management’s commitment to the safety o f their 
employees. As management’s commitment to safety increase, so does the amount of 
resources it invests in modem, technologically advanced equipment. Equipment has a 
tremendous impact on the safety status of an organization. The safety o f the most
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competent, safety-focused individuals can be compromised with the use o f out-dated 
tools and equipment.
Over the years, the manufacturers of construction equipment and tools have shifted its 
focus not only on increased productivity, but also increased safety of the individuals who 
use them. For example, cranes are being designed with hi-defmition monitoring systems 
which increase visibility of workers and activities that are occurring below. In addition 
to monitoring systems, anti-two block systems have become standard safety equipment 
on cranes. Cranes are just one example of the many, major advancements that equipment 
manufacturers have made to increase safety efforts in the construction industry. The 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the governing voice o f standards for 
consumer goods in the United States has also increased its’ standards for participating 
organizations to ensure the health and safety of workers that utilize the products. In 
addition to safety, a major advantage of technologically-advanced equipment is that it can 
increase productivity on the job site. There is also a positive causal relationship between 
the number of pieces of modem equipment a company uses (owns or rents) and the 
amount of productivity that is achieved on the construction project. In addition to safety, 
modem tools and equipment are designed for increased productivity. It is important to 
point out, that the increase in new state-of-the art equipment will also require workers to 
receive training on safe, effective operations of the newly, acquired equipment. 
Productivity plays a major part in other causal relationships in this systems thinking 
model
In most cases safety has never been the overall, driving principle (priority) of the 
construction industry. Typically, management overemphasizes production, cost, and
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even quality over safety (McSween, 2003). As previously stated, the reason that safety is 
not the overall priority of the construction industry is because safety is considered to be 
an overhead cost. It is an activity that does not directly yield profits. Most construction 
employers fail to realize the impact that safety can have on productivity. Workers 
commitment to safety is the result o f training, experience level, and overall commitment 
of management itself. When workers embrace the safety culture of an organization they 
will not only become committed to achieving safety-related goals and objectives, but all 
organizational goals including productivity. When workers are confident about their 
safety and well-being in their work environment it is believed that they will work more 
efficiently to accomplish tasks.
The goal of any organization is to get the greatest performance from its workforce as 
possible. Often, workers are pressured by management to achieve high and sometimes 
unrealistic goals and milestones. The pressure to perform faster and produce more often 
causes workers to “cut comers” during activities to make up time. Because workers 
generally perform the same tasks daily they get complacent in regards to safety. They 
focus more on productivity, but neglect safety because they feel overconfident that their 
actions (cutting comers) will not lead to injury. The systems thinking model illustrates 
the negative causal relationship that exists between productivity and job pressure. As 
productivity increase, job pressure from upper level management to produce more 
decreases, and vice versa. As a result, another causal relationship exists—there is a 
positive causal relationship that exists between job pressure and accidents. The systems 
thinking model illustrates that as job pressure on workers by upper management 
increases, accidents occurring on job site will also increase, and vice versa. O f course.
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the goal is to achieve that latter—job pressure decrease and accidents decrease. There is 
a major difference between working fast and working efficient. When workers 
experience pressure from management they tend to work faster. Failure to tie-off and 
working without necessary personal protective equipment are two common examples of 
“cutting comers” that workers fail to perform to make up time on the jobsite.
The final relationship that exists in this loop of the system thinking diagram is 
between accidents and labor commitment to safety. The relationship that exists between 
these two factors is negative. The systems thinking model illustrates that as the number 
of accidents on a construction site decreases, labor/worker commitment to the safety 
culture of the organization increases. A decrease in accidents or zero-accident job site 
reinforces the notion that the organizational commitment to construction safety culture 
has paid off.
Throughout this thesis I have made references on how to achieve a construction 
safety culture. A zero-accident job site is a likely indication that a safety culture exists 
within that organization. Decreased accidents means that everyone in the organization, 
specifically the workers, have performed their tasks safely and in a manner which has 
prevented injury to themselves and others in the work environment.
The variable ‘accidents’ is also related to other important variables in the systems 
thinking model. There is a positive causal relationship that exists between accidents and 
an organization’s experience modification rate. The other positive causal relationship 
exists between accidents and OSHA fines. Finally, a negative causal relationship exists 
between accidents and public perception.
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An organization’s EMR is directly impacted by the number o f accidents that occurs in 
that company in a certain time period. As mentioned previously, the EMR of an 
organization is a comparison of that organization’s workers compensation claim to other 
organization of the similar size. Many accidents on the jobsite result in workers 
compensation claims. According to the number of accidents an organization has 
experienced, an experience modification rating is assigned. The experience modification 
rate determines the annual insurance premium that companies must pay to insure their 
operations. The systems thinking model illustrates that as the number of accidents an 
organization experiences increases, the company’s experience modification rate also 
increase. As managers, we strive to reduce our organizations experience modification 
rate to reduce costs of operation. The average experience modification rate is 1.0.
Falling under this number for example, an EMR of .80, means that the organization has 
an above average rating in regards to safety. Anything above 1.0 indicates that an 
organization is above its industry counterparts in regards to safety. The latter indicates a 
need for an effective safety program. If the EMR increases, the overall costs of operating 
the construction business will also increase. This positive causal relationship is 
illustrated in the systems thinking diagram.
Accidents that result in injury and/or death typically involve penalties issued by 
OSHA. The systems thinking model illustrates the positive relationship between 
accidents and OSHA fines. The Occupational Safety and Health Act o f 1970 placed the 
responsibility of providing a safe and healthy working environment on employers.
Failure to comply with OSHA regulations results in fines. The following table provides a 
good representation o f the severity of the safety problem for the construction industry.
74
The Table 6 presents the total amount of violations and the amount of money collected in 
fines in 2002.
Table 6. OSHA Violations and Penalties in 2002 (OSHA, 2002)
OSHA's Federal Inspections by Type of Violation (Fiscal Year 2002)
No. of 
Violations Percent Type Current Penalties ($)
54,842 70% Serious 48,312,043
20,749 26%
Other-than-
Serious 2,145,151
1,969 2.50% Repeat 7,710,736
416 0.50% Willful 11,799,539
231 0.30% Failure to Abate 597,301
226 0.30% State Inspections 2,268,508
78,433 100% Total 72,827,278
In 2002 alone, OSHA issued citations for 78, 433 violation totaling $72,827,278 in 
fines. Whether employers spend the money on an effective safety program or spend 
money in fines resulting from accidents, the fact is that safety will impact the overall 
costs an organization, one way or another.
Public perception plays a rather unique and important role in this entire systems 
thinking model. In the systems thinking model, there is a negative causal relationship 
between accidents and public perception of the construction organization or system. The 
model illustrates that as the number of accidents increase, there is a decrease in the 
public’s perception of that construction system including the client/owner and the general 
contractor. Image is everything. No matter how spectacular a project or structure may 
be, the poor safety culture of the system could destroy the public’s perception of the 
project and all parties involved including the owner/client and the contractors.
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Public’s perception of an owner/client and contractors may be a driving force for 
making a commitment to construction safety culture. No organization wants to be the 
target of bad press. Public perception can play a role in the financial interests of 
organizations. For example, if it is publicly known that a contractor has subpar 
performance with respect to safety it may be difficult to pre-qualify for various projects. 
The average owner will not carry a company with a poor safety history on the owner- 
controlled insurance program (OCIP) because these companies are a liability to the 
owner. Implications of poor safety culture exist for the owner as well. Also, if 
owners/clients have a poor safety history on their projects this will affect the cost of 
insurance premiums. Public’s perception of the owner may also affect the success of the 
business once it has been constructed and open for operation. Therefore, in response to 
public perception, both owners and corporate level management must make a full 
commitment to the construction safety culture of the system. The systems thinking 
model illustrates a positive causal relationship between public perception and the 
owner/client commitment to construction safety culture. It is important to point at that 
the relationship between these two variables may also exist as a negative causal 
relationship. As public perception o f an owner/client or project goes down, the owner’s 
commitment to construction safety culture may increase.
Whether the relationship between public perception and owner commitment to safety 
exist as negative or positive, the relationship results in the owner/client increasing its 
standards and criteria for prequalifying contractors to construct their projects. The 
systems thinking model illustrates the positive relationship between the owner/client 
commitment to construction safety culture and contractor selection criteria. As the
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owner’s commitment to construction safety culture increases there is an increase in the 
number o f contractor selection criteria that the owner uses to screen or pre-qualify 
potential contractors. The vision of safety must be shared by all parties involved in the 
construction project. Adversarial relationships often exist between the owner/client and 
contractors during the construction process. These relationships tend to improve 
sometimes only after the owner and contractor have multiple business ventures. To 
achieve a safety culture, these differences between owners and contractors must be set 
aside immediately to accomplish a more important goal of a zero-accident construction 
project. Safety is a team process; owners and contractors cannot exist as separate entities. 
In every team each individual is assigned responsibilities that are critical to the overall 
success of the team. Owners and contractors must share the same vision for success of 
safety culture. Owners must have a stringent prequalification/screening process in which 
they are able to determine if the shared vision of safety culture exists in prospective 
contractors. This same process must be repeated when general contractors select 
potential sub-contractors.
In the model, there is no definite ending point. When systems thinking models are 
converted into system dynamics models it is important to run the model long enough to 
see the dynamics of the problem or issue play out.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This systems thinking model provides an understanding for the interconnectedness of 
the many factors requisite in achieving a construction safety culture. The ultimate goal of 
construction safety culture is to reduce and/or eliminate the number of accidents in the 
industry, improve the productivity o f our workforces, build more positive business 
images, reduce cost associated with accidents, produce highly trained, competent 
workers, and select more safety-conscious subcontractors, vendors, and design personnel. 
This study has revealed that the major underlying cause of failure o f safety culture in the 
construction industry results from management’s (both corporate and project level) lack 
of commitment to safety and the enforcement o f its safety program. O f course, 
construction safety culture may not be limited to just these variables that have been 
presented in this thesis. Admittedly, this model may not result in a “one-size fits all” 
solution to achieving construction safety culture. Creating systems thinking models 
entails that we are predicting the behavior of a system over time. This systems thinking 
model o f construction safety culture provides a vivid image of those factors that are 
critical to the establishment and maintenance of construction safety; however, no model 
will ever be 100% accurate. Kim (1992) states that “drawing out future behavior means 
taking a risk—the risk o f being wrong. The fact is, any projection of the future will be 
wrong, but by making it explicit, we can test our assumptions and uncover
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inconsistencies that may otherwise never get surfaced.” When making predictions, 
especially on the behavior of complex systems we run the risk of having some 
inaccuracies; however the systems thinking approach does provide one guaranteed 
benefit—assessment.
An assessment tool is critical to the success and maintenance of any program. The 
goal of a safety program assessment is to ensure that the goals and objectives of the 
program are being met, and to determine which criteria, procedures, and/or practices may 
be lacking and in need of improvement. All-in-all, an assessment tool serves as a “reality 
check” of our beliefs and speculations about the status of our organization’s safety 
program. McSween (2003) provides several objectives o f safety assessments including: 
(1) identifying existing efforts and develop a plan that builds on these efforts, (2) 
incorporate input from key personnel, (3) identifying high risk areas, (4) identifying 
training needs, and (5) build management support for implementation. To assess the 
status of a safety culture within a system, an organization must determine the collective 
attitudes o f all employees (both management and operational levels) about the various 
factors that make up that system. This is best achieved by performing confidential 
questionnaires (perception survey), interviews, focus group meetings, and visits to assess 
workplace conditions and possible causes to incidents. Because safety is such a problem 
for the construction industry, it is best to have a system which allows the system to be 
continually assessed; not only after an incident has occurred, but also when we feel that 
the program is performing at it best. Historically, organizations have taken the reactive 
approach to safety implementation. Only after accidents have occurred do they attempt
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to figure out what aspect of their safety program has failed. Data supports the notion that 
the reactive approach to construction safety has been unsuccessful.
It is recommended that this system thinking model o f construction safety culture be 
converted to a system dynamics model to serve as an assessment tool. The benefit o f the 
systems thinking/system dynamics approach to construction safety culture is that it 
identifies system errors and allows problems to be addressed before accidents occur. 
Hence, system dynamics is a proactive approach to solving problems. In order to convert 
the mental model that has been created in this thesis into a system dynamics model, we 
must take the information from the causal relationships and apply parameter values to 
them that have been taken from various sources, i.e. statistical analysis of time series 
data. The numerical data may then be fed into modeling and simulation programs, such 
as Vensim, to simulate the behavior of the various factors within the system. The 
benefits that system dynamics may have on safety and the construction industry, as a 
whole, may be endless. The ultimate benefit is that if we, as managers, have a tool that 
provides information on potential failures within our safety programs we can direct our 
attention to that source that requires improvement or change all together. Corrective 
action to prevent further injuries and/or fatalities may be initiated before they become 
reality. Systems thinking and system dynamics are appropriate tools for understanding 
the interconnectedness of those factors that must exist to create and maintain a safety 
culture in complex, construction systems. Past research has studied safety in various 
ways that have seemed less successful in determining why this problem has plagued the 
industry for far too long. Systems thinking illustrates that all aspects of construction 
safety culture have failed because management has failed to make and demonstrate a full
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commitment. Making safety the so-called Priority” has proved only to be a catchy 
slogan on company banners. To reduce injuries and fatalities in the construction 
industry, we must make a shift from safety being our “ 1®' Priority” to our way of life— 
our culture.
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